There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.
Introduction
It was a little after 9am on Friday, July 20th 2018, when a four-year-old boy accidentally shot his two-year old cousin in the town of Muscoy in Southern California. The victim was taken to a hospital, where she died an hour later (Oreskes 2018). The police arrested Cesar Lopez, victim's grandfather, as a felon in possession of a firearm and for child endangerment (Juarez and Miracle 2018) .
The first charge against Lopez, a previously convicted felon, is based on California Penal Code §29800 (a) (1) that prohibits firearm access to "any person who has been convicted of, or has an outstanding warrant for, a felony under the laws of the United States, the State of California, or any other state, government, or country...". We assume that Lopez knew that California state law bans him from owning a gun, but his actions guaranteed that he broke the law.
The second charge is different because Lopez clearly never intended for his granddaughter to be killed. He never took any actions that would force her death. Nevertheless, he is blamed for not taking an action (locking the gun) to prevent the tragedy. Blameworthiness is tightly connected to the legal liability for negligence (Goudkamp 2004) .
We are interested in logical systems for reasoning about different forms of responsibility. Xu (1998) introduced a complete axiomatization of a modal logical system for reasoning about responsibility defined as taking actions that guarantee a certain outcome. In our example, by possessing a gun Lopez guaranteed that he was responsible for braking California law. Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard (2009) extended Xu's work from individual responsibility to group responsibility. In this paper we propose a complete logical system for reasoning about another form of responsibility that we call blameworthiness: a coalition is blamable for an outcome ϕ if ϕ is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent ϕ. In our example, Lopez had a strategy to prevent the death by keeping the gun in a safe place.
Principle of Alternative Possibilities Throughout centuries, blameworthiness, especially in the context of free will and moral responsibility, has been at the focus of philosophical discussions (Singer and Eddon 2013) . Modern works on this topic include (Fields 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 2000; Nichols and Knobe 2007; Mason 2015; Widerker 2017) . Frankfurt (1969) acknowledges that a dominant role in these discussions has been played by what he calls a principle of alternate possibilities: "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise". As with many general principles, this one has many limitations that Frankfurt discusses; for example, when a person is coerced into doing something. Following the established tradition (Widerker 2017), we refer to this principle as the principle of alternative possibilities. Cushman (2015) talks about counterfactual possibility: "a person could have prevented their harmful conduct, even though they did not."
Halpern and Pearl proposed several versions of a formal definition of causality as a relation between sets of variables (Halpern 2016) . This definition uses the counterfactual requirement which formalizes the principle of alternative possibilities. Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner (2018) used a similar setting to define degrees of blameworthiness. Batusov and Soutchanski (2018) gave a counterfactual-based definition of causality in situation calculus. Pauly (2001; 2002) introduced logics of coalitional power that can be used to describe group abilities to achieve a certain result. His approach has been widely studied in the literature (Goranko 2001; van der Hoek and Wooldridge 2005; Borgo 2007; Sauro et al. 2006; Ågotnes et al. 2010; Agotnes, van der Hoek, and Wooldridge 2009; Belardinelli 2014; Goranko, Jamroga, and Turrini 2013; Alechina et al. 2011; Galimullin and Alechina 2017; Goranko and Enqvist 2018) .
Coalitional Power in Strategic Games
In this paper we use Marc Pauly's framework to define blameworthiness of coalitions of players in strategic (oneshot) games. We say that a coalition C could be blamed for an outcome ϕ if ϕ is true, but the coalition C had a strategy to prevent ϕ. Thus, just like Halpern and Pearl's formal definition of causality, our definition of blameworthiness is based on the principle of alternative possibilities. However, because Marc Pauly's framework separates agents and outcomes, the proposed definition of blameworthiness is different and, arguably, more succinct.
The main technical result of this paper is a sound and complete bimodal logical system describing the interplay between group blameworthiness modality and necessity (or universal truth) modality. Our system is significantly different from earlier mentioned axiomatizations (Xu 1998) and (Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard 2009 ) because our semantics incorporates the principle of alternative possibilities.
Paper Outline This paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the formal syntax and semantics of our logical system. Next, we state and discuss its axioms. In the section that follows, we give examples of formal derivations in our system. In the next two sections we prove the soundness and the completeness. The last section concludes with a discussion of possible future work.
Syntax and Semantics
In this paper we assume a fixed set A of agents and a fixed set of propositional variables Prop. By a coalition we mean an arbitrary subset of set A. Definition 1 Φ is the minimal set of formulae such that 1. p ∈ Φ for each variable p ∈ Prop, 2. ϕ → ψ, ¬ϕ ∈ Φ for all formulae ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ, 3. Nϕ, B C ϕ ∈ Φ for each coalition C ⊆ A and each formula ϕ ∈ Φ. In other words, language Φ is defined by grammar:
Formula Nϕ is read as "statement ϕ is true under each play" and formula B C ϕ as "coalition C is blamable for ϕ".
Boolean connectives ∨, ∧, and ↔ as well as constants ⊥ and ⊤ are defined in the standard way. By formula Nϕ we mean ¬N¬ϕ. For the disjunction of multiple formulae, we assume that parentheses are nested to the left. That is, formula χ 1 ∨ χ 2 ∨ χ 3 is a shorthand for (χ 1 ∨ χ 2 ) ∨ χ 3 . As usual, the empty disjunction is defined to be ⊥. For any two sets X and Y , by X Y we denote the set of all functions from Y to X.
The formal semantics of modalities N and B is defined in terms of models, which we call games.
Definition 2 A game is a tuple (∆, Ω, P, π), where 1. ∆ is a nonempty set of "actions", 2. Ω is a set of "outcomes", 3. the set of "plays" P is an arbitrary set of pairs (δ, ω) such that δ ∈ ∆ A and ω ∈ Ω,
4. π is a function that maps Prop into subsets of P .
The example from the introduction can be captured in our setting by assuming that Lopez is the only actor who has two possible actions: hide and expose the gun in the game with two outcomes alive and dead. Although a complete action profile is a function from the set of all agents to the domain of actions, in a single agent case any such profile can be described by specifying just the action of the single player. Thus, by complete action profile hide we mean action profile that maps agent Lopez into action hide. The set of possible plays of this game consists of pairs {(hide, alive), (expose, alive), (expose, dead)}.
The above definition of a game is very close but not identical to the definition of a game frame in Pauly (2001; 2002) and the definition of a concurrent game structure, the semantics of ATL (Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman 2002) . Unlike these works, here we assume that the domain of choices is the same for all states and all agents. This difference is insignificant because all domains of choices in a game frame/concurrent game structure could be replaced with their union. More importantly, we assume that the mechanism is a relation, not a function. Our approach is more general, as it allows us to talk about blameworthiness in nondeterministic games, it also results in fewer axioms. Also, we do not assume that for any complete action profile δ there is at least one outcome ω such that (δ, ω) ∈ P . Thus, we allow the system to terminate under some action profiles without reaching an outcome. Without this assumption, we would need to add one extra axiom: ¬B C ⊥ and to make minor changes in the proof of the completeness.
Finally, in this paper we assume that atomic propositions are interpreted as statements about plays, not just outcomes. For example, the meaning of an atomic proposition p could be statement "either Lopez locked his gun or his granddaughter is dead". This is a more general approach than the one used in the existing literature, where atomic propositions are usually interpreted as statements about just outcomes. This difference is formally captured in the above definition through the assumption that value of π is a set of plays, not just a set of outcomes. As a result of this more general approach, all other statements in our logical system are also statements about plays, not outcomes. This is why relation in Definition 3 has a play (not an outcome) on the left. If s 1 and s 2 are action profiles of coalitions C 1 and C 2 , respectively, and C is any coalition such that C ⊆ C 1 ∩ C 2 , then we write s 1 = C s 2 to denote that s 1 (a) = s 2 (a) for each agent a ∈ C.
Next is the key definition of this paper. Its item 5 formally specifies blameworthiness using the principle of alternative possibilities.
Definition 3 For any play (δ, ω) ∈ P of a game (∆, Ω, P, π) and any formula ϕ ∈ Φ, the satisfiability relation (δ, ω) ϕ is defined recursively as follows:
Axioms
In addition to the propositional tautologies in language Φ, our logical system contains the following axioms.
1. Truth: Nϕ → ϕ and B C ϕ → ϕ,
We write ⊢ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the axioms of our system using the Modus Ponens and the Necessitation inference rules:
We write X ⊢ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the theorems of our logical system and an additional set of axioms X using only the Modus Ponens inference rule. The Truth axiom for modality N, the Distributivity axiom, and the Negative Introspection axiom together with the Necessitation inference rule capture the fact that modality N, per Definition 3, is an S5 modality and thus satisfies all standard S5 properties.
The Truth axiom for modality B states that any coalition can be blamed only for a statement which is true. The None to Blame axiom states that the empty coalition cannot be blamed for anything. Intuitively, this axiom is true because the empty coalition has no power to prevent anything.
The Joint Responsibility axiom states that if disjoint coalitions C and D can be blamed for statements ϕ and ψ, respectively, on some other (possibly two different) plays of the game and the disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ is true on the current play, then the union of the two coalitions can be blamed for this disjunction on the current play. This axiom remotely resembles Xu (1998) axiom for independence of individual agents, which in our notations can be stated as
Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard (2009) captured the independence of disjoint coalitions C and D in their Lemma 17:
In spite of these similarities, the definition of responsibility used in (Xu 1998) and (Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard 2009) does not assume the principle of alternative possibilities. The Joint Responsibility axiom is also similar to Marc Pauly (2001; 2002) Cooperation axiom for logic of coalitional power:
where coalitions C and D are disjoint and S C ϕ stands for "coalition C has a strategy to achieve ϕ".
The Blame for Cause axiom states that if formula ϕ universally implies ψ (informally, ϕ is a "cause" of ψ), then any coalition blamable for ψ should also be blamable for the "cause" ϕ as long as ϕ is actually true. The Monotonicity axiom states that any coalition is blamed for anything that a subcoalition is blamed for. Finally, the Fairness axiom states that if a coalition C is blamed for ϕ, then it should be blamed for ϕ whenever ϕ is true.
Examples of Derivations
The soundness of the axioms of our logical system is established in the next section. In this section we give several examples of formal proofs in our system. Together with the Truth axiom, the first example shows that statements B C B C ϕ and B C ϕ are equivalent in our system. That is, coalition C can be blamed for being blamed for ϕ if and only if it can be blamed for ϕ.
PROOF. Note that ⊢ B C ϕ → ϕ by the Truth axiom. Thus, ⊢ N(B C ϕ → ϕ) by the Necessitation rule. At the same time,
is an instance of the Blame for Cause axiom. Then,
The rest of the examples in this section are used later in the proof of the completeness.
by the Necessitation inference rule. Hence, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
At the same time, by the Negative Introspection axiom:
Thus, by the laws of propositional reasoning,
Hence, by the law of contrapositive,
is an instance of the Truth axiom. Thus, by propositional reasoning,
PROOF. By the Blame for Cause axiom,
Assumption ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ implies ⊢ ψ → ϕ by the laws of propositional reasoning. Thus, ⊢ N(ψ → ϕ) by the Necessitation inference rule. Hence, by the Modus Ponens rule,
( 
PROOF. We prove the lemma by induction on n. If n = 0, then disjunction χ 1 ∨· · ·∨χ n is Boolean constant false ⊥ by definition. Thus, the statement of the lemma is ⊥ ⊢ B ∅ ⊥, which is provable in the propositional logic due to the assumption ⊥ on the left-hand side of ⊢.
Next, suppose that n = 1. Then, from Lemma 2 it follows that NB D1 χ 1 , χ 1 ⊢ B D1 χ 1 .
Suppose that n ≥ 2. By the Joint Responsibility axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
Thus, by Lemma 4,
At the same time, by the induction hypothesis,
Similarly, by the Joint Responsibility axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
is provable in the propositional logic, by Lemma 3,
Finally, note that the following statement is provable in the propositional logic for n ≥ 2,
Therefore, from statement (2) and statement (3),
by the laws of propositional reasoning. ⊠ Lemma 6 If ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ⊢ ψ, then Nϕ 1 , . . . , Nϕ n ⊢ Nψ.
PROOF. By the deduction lemma applied n times, assumption ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ⊢ ψ implies that
Hence, by the Necessitation inference rule,
Thus, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens,
Hence, by the Modus Ponens inference rule,
Therefore, by applying the previous steps (n − 1) more times, Nϕ 1 , . . . , Nϕ n ⊢ Nψ. ⊠ Lemma 7 ⊢ Nϕ → NNϕ.
PROOF. Formula N¬Nϕ → ¬Nϕ is an instance of the Truth axiom. Thus, ⊢ Nϕ → ¬N¬Nϕ by contraposition. Hence, taking into account the following instance of the Negative Introspection axiom: ¬N¬Nϕ → N¬N¬Nϕ, we have
At the same time, ¬Nϕ → N¬Nϕ is an instance of the Negative Introspection axiom. Thus, ⊢ ¬N¬Nϕ → Nϕ by the law of contrapositive in the propositional logic. Hence, by the Necessitation inference rule, ⊢ N(¬N¬Nϕ → Nϕ). Thus, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule, ⊢ N¬N¬Nϕ → NNϕ. The latter, together with statement (4), implies the statement of the lemma by propositional reasoning. ⊠ Lemma 8 For any integer n ≥ 0 and any disjoint sets
PROOF. By Lemma 5,
Thus, by the Monotonicity axiom,
{NB Di χ i } n i=1 , χ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ χ n ⊢ B C (χ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ χ n ).
Hence, by the Modus Ponens inference rule
By the Truth axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
is an instance of the Blame for Cause axiom. Thus, by the Modus Ponens inference rule applied twice,
By the Modus Ponens inference rule,
By the deduction lemma,
By the definition of modality N, the Negative Introspection axiom, and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
Therefore, by Lemma 7 and the Modus Ponens inference rule, the statement of the lemma follows. ⊠
Soundness
In the following lemmas, (δ, ω) ∈ P is a play of an arbitrary game (∆, Ω, P, π) and ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ are arbitrary formulae.
Lemma 9 (δ, ω) B ∅ ϕ.
PROOF. Suppose that (δ, ω) B ∅ ϕ. Thus, by Definition 3, we have (δ, ω) ϕ and there is an action profile s ∈ ∆ ∅ such that for each play (δ
In other words, (δ, ω) ϕ, which leads to a contradiction. ⊠
Lemma 10 For all sets
PROOF. Let (δ, ω) NB C ϕ and (δ, ω) NB D ψ. Thus, by Definition 3 and the definition of modality N, there are plays (δ 1 , ω 1 ) ∈ P and (δ 2 , ω 2 ) ∈ P such that (δ 1 , ω 1 )
Note that the action profile s is well-defined because sets C and D are disjoint by the assumption of the lemma. The choice of action profiles s 1 , s 2 , and s implies that for each play (δ
by Definition 3 and due to the assumption (δ, ω) ϕ ∨ ψ of the lemma. ⊠
′ by Definition 3. Hence, (δ, ω) B C ϕ by Definition 3 and the assumption (δ, ω) ϕ of the lemma. ⊠
Lemma 12 For all sets
PROOF. By Definition 3, assumption (δ, ω) B C ϕ implies that (δ, ω) ϕ and there is s ∈ ∆ C such that for each play
Then, by the choice of action profile s and because
B D ϕ by Definition 3 and because (δ, ω) ϕ, as we have shown earlier.
⊠
Thus, again by Definition 3, it suffices to prove there is s ∈ ∆ C such that for each play (δ
The last statement follows from the assumption (δ, ω) B C ϕ and Definition 3. ⊠
Completeness
We start the proof of the completeness by defining the canonical game G(ω 0 ) = (∆, Ω, P, π) for each maximal consistent set of formulae ω 0 .
Definition 4 The set of outcomes Ω is the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulae ω such that for each formula
Informally, an action of an agent in the canonical game is designed to "veto" a formula. The domain of choices of the canonical model consists of all formulae in set Φ. To veto a formula ψ, an agent must choose action ψ. The mechanism of the canonical game guarantees that if NB C ψ ∈ ω 0 and all agents in the coalition C veto formula ψ, then ¬ψ is satisfied in the outcome.
Definition 5
The domain of actions ∆ is set Φ.
Definition 6 The set P ⊆ ∆
A ×Ω consists of all pairs (δ, ω) such that for any formula NB C ψ ∈ ω 0 , if δ(a) = ψ for each agent a ∈ C, then ¬ψ ∈ ω.
This concludes the definition of the canonical game G(ω 0 ). The next four lemmas are auxiliary results leading to the proof of the completeness in Theorem 1.
Lemma 14
For any play (δ, ω) ∈ P , any action profile s ∈ ∆ C , and any formula ¬(ϕ → B C ϕ) ∈ ω, there is a play
PROOF. Consider the following set of formulae:
Claim 1 Set X is consistent.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Suppose the opposite. Thus, there are formulae
and formulae
Without loss of generality, we can assume that formulae χ 1 , . . . , χ n are distinct. Thus, assumption (8) implies that sets D 1 , . . . , D n are pairwise disjoint. By propositional reasoning, assumption (9) implies that
Thus, by Lemma 6,
Hence, by assumption (5),
Thus, by Lemma 8, using assumptions (6) and the fact that sets D 1 , . . . , D n are pairwise disjoint,
Hence N(ϕ → B C ) ∈ ω 0 because set ω 0 is maximal. Then, ϕ → B C ∈ ω by Definition 4, which contradicts the assumption ¬(ϕ → B C ) ∈ ω of the lemma because set ω is consistent. Therefore, set X is consistent. ⊠ Let ω ′ be any maximal consistent extension of set X. Thus, ϕ ∈ X ⊆ ω ′ by the choice of sets X and ω ′ . Also, ω ′ ∈ Ω by Definition 4 and the choice of sets X and ω ′ . Let the complete action profile δ ′ be defined as follows:
PROOF OF CLAIM. Consider any formula NB D χ ∈ ω 0 such that δ ′ (a) = χ for each a ∈ D. By Definition 6, it suffices to show that ¬χ ∈ ω ′ . Case I: D ⊆ C. Thus, ¬χ ∈ X by the definition of set X. Therefore, ¬χ ∈ ω ′ by the choice of set ω ′ . PROOF. Define a complete action profile δ such that δ(a) = ⊥ for each agent a ∈ A. To prove (δ, ω) ∈ P , consider any formula NB D χ ∈ ω 0 such that δ(a) = χ for each a ∈ D. By Definition 6, it suffices to show that ¬χ ∈ ω.
Case I: D = ∅. Thus, ⊢ ¬B D χ by the None to Blame axiom. Hence, ⊢ N¬B D χ by the Necessitation inference rule. Then, ¬N¬B D χ / ∈ ω 0 by the consistency of the set ω 0 . Therefore, NB D χ / ∈ ω 0 by the definition of the modality N, which contradicts the choice of formula NB D χ. Case II: D = ∅. Thus, there is at least one agent d 0 ∈ D. Hence, χ = δ(d 0 ) = ⊥ by the choice of formula NB D χ and the definition of the complete action profile δ. Then, ¬χ is a tautology. Thus, ¬χ ∈ ω by the maximality of set ω. ⊠
Lemma 16
For any play (δ, ω) ∈ P and any formula ¬Nϕ ∈ ω, there is a play (δ ′ , ω ′ ) ∈ P such that ¬ϕ ∈ ω ′ .
PROOF. Consider the set X = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | Nψ ∈ ω 0 }. First, we show that set X is consistent. Suppose the opposite. Thus, there are formulae Nψ 1 , . . . , Nψ n ∈ ω 0 such that ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ⊢ ϕ. Hence, Nψ 1 , . . . , Nψ n ⊢ Nϕ by Lemma 6. Thus, ω 0 ⊢ Nϕ because Nψ 1 , . . . , Nψ n ∈ ω 0 . Hence, ω 0 ⊢ NNϕ by Lemma 7. Therefore, Nϕ ∈ ω by assumption ω ∈ Ω and Definition 4. Hence, ¬Nϕ / ∈ ω by the consistency of set ω, which contradicts the assumption of the lemma. Thus, set X is consistent.
Let ω ′ be any maximal consistent extension of set X. Note that ¬ϕ ∈ X ⊆ ω ′ by the definition of set X. By Lemma 15, there is a complete action profile δ
Lemma 17 (δ, ω) ϕ iff ϕ ∈ ω for each play (δ, ω) ∈ P and each formula ϕ ∈ Φ.
PROOF. We prove the lemma by structural induction on formula ϕ. If ϕ is a propositional variable, then the required follows from Definition 3 and Definition 7. The cases when ϕ is an implication or a negation follow from the maximality and the consistency of set ω in the standard way. Suppose that formula ϕ has the form Nψ. (⇒) : Let Nψ / ∈ ω. Thus, ¬Nψ ∈ ω by the maximality of set ω. Hence, by Lemma 16, there is a play (δ ′ , ω ′ ) ∈ P such that ¬ψ ∈ ω ′ . Then, ψ / ∈ ω ′ by the consistency of set ω ′ . Thus, (δ ′ , ω ′ ) ψ by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, (δ, ω) Nψ by Definition 3. (⇐) : Let Nψ ∈ ω. Thus, ¬Nψ / ∈ ω by the consistency of set ω. Hence, N¬Nψ / ∈ ω 0 by Definition 4. Then, ω 0 N¬Nψ by the maximality of set ω 0 . Thus, ω 0 ¬Nψ by the Negative Introspection axiom. Hence, Nψ ∈ ω 0 by the maximality of set ω 0 . Then, ψ ∈ ω ′ for each ω ′ ∈ Ω by Definition 4. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, (δ
Therefore, (δ, ω) Nψ by Definition 3. Suppose that formula ϕ has the form B C ψ. (⇒) : Assume that B C ψ / ∈ ω. First, we consider the case when ψ / ∈ ω. Then, (δ, ω) ψ by the induction hypothesis. Hence, (δ, ω) B C ψ by Definition 3.
Next, assume that ψ ∈ ω. Note that ψ → B C ψ / ∈ ω. Indeed, if ψ → B C ψ ∈ ω, then ω ⊢ B C ψ by the Modus Ponens inference rule. Thus, B C ψ ∈ ω by the maximality of set ω, which contradicts the assumption above.
Because ω is a maximal set, statement ψ → B C ψ / ∈ ω implies that ¬(ψ → B C ψ) ∈ ω. Thus, by Lemma 14, for any action profile s ∈ ∆ C , there is a play (δ ′ , ω ′ ) such that ψ ∈ ω ′ . Hence, by the induction hypothesis, for any action profile s ∈ ∆ C there is a play (δ
Suppose that B C ψ ∈ ω. Thus, ω ⊢ ψ by the Truth axiom. Hence, ψ ∈ ω by the maximality of the set ω. Thus, (δ, ω) ψ by the induction hypothesis.
Next, define an action profile s ∈ ∆ C to be such that s(a) = ψ for each a ∈ C. Consider any play (δ ′ , ω ′ ) ∈ P such that s = C δ ′ . By Definition 3, it suffices to show that (δ ′ , ω ′ ) ψ. Statement B C ψ ∈ ω implies that ¬B C ψ / ∈ ω because set ω is consistent. Thus, N¬B C ψ / ∈ ω 0 by Definition 4 and because ω ∈ Ω. Hence, ¬N¬B C ψ ∈ ω 0 due to the maximality of the set ω 0 . Thus, NB C ψ ∈ ω 0 by the definition of modality N. Also, δ ′ (a) = s(a) = ψ for each a ∈ C. Hence, ¬ψ ∈ ω ′ by Definition 6 and the assumption (δ ′ , ω ′ ) ∈ P . Then, ψ / ∈ ω ′ by the consistency of set ω ′ . Therefore, (δ ′ , ω ′ ) ψ by the induction hypothesis. ⊠
We are now ready to state and prove the strong completeness of our logical system. Theorem 1 If X ϕ, then there is a game, a complete action profile δ, and an outcome ω of this game such that (δ, ω) χ for each χ ∈ X and (δ, ω) ϕ. PROOF. Suppose that X ϕ. Thus, set X ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent. Let ω 0 be any maximal consistent extension of set X ∪ {¬ϕ} and G(ω 0 ) = (∆, Ω, P, π) be the canonical game defined above. Note that ω 0 ∈ Ω by Definition 4 and the Truth axiom.
By Lemma 15, there exists a complete action profile δ ∈ ∆ A such that (δ, ω 0 ) ∈ P . Thus, (δ, ω 0 ) χ for each χ ∈ X and (δ, ω 0 ) ¬ϕ by Lemma 17 and the choice of set ω 0 . Therefore, (δ, ω 0 ) ϕ by Definition 3. ⊠
Conclusion
In this paper we defined a formal semantics of blameworthiness using the principle of alternative possibilities and Marc Pauly's framework for logics of coalitional power. Our main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that captures properties of blameworthiness in this setting. This work is meant to be a step towards formal reasoning about blameworthiness and responsibility. Recently, there have been several works combining Marc Pauly's and epistemic logic frameworks to study the interplay between knowledge and know-how strategies (Ågotnes and Alechina 2012; Agotnes and Alechina 2016; Naumov and Tao 2017; Naumov and Tao 2018b; Naumov and Tao 2018c; Naumov and Tao 2018a) as well as a study of such strategies in a single-agent case (Fervari et al. 2017) . Knowledge is clearly relevant to the study of blameworthiness. Indeed, one can hardly be blamed for not preventing an outcome if one had a strategy to prevent it but did not know what this strategy was. Furthermore, in the legal domain, responsibility is connected to knowledge. For example, US Model Penal Code specifies five types of responsibility based on what the responsible party knew or should have known (Institute 1985 Print) . In the future, we plan to explore the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness/responsibility by introducing epistemic component to the framework of this paper.
